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Abstract. The claim has been made that when Aquinas speaks about the virtue of 
truth and its opposing vices in the Summa theologiae (ST) 2-2.109-113, he regards 
himself as speaking of the same virtue of truth as found in the Nicomachean 
Ethics 4.7. In this paper, I dispute this claim, showing how Aquinas’s account 
cannot be Aristotelian and, in particular, that the possibility of forfeiting the 
virtue of truth by one serious lie cannot be explained by habituation. I argue 
instead that Aquinas’s account can be better understood by reference to the 
kind of embodied experience most commonly encountered in joint attention 
or second-person relatedness, an approach that may offer new ways to address 
broader moral questions regarding truth.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
In Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics, a recent book dedicated to the 
question of how Aquinas deals with and depends on Aristotle’s ethics, 
Kevin Flannery S. J. writes,
In ST 2-2.109, Aquinas introduces what he speaks of as the virtue of truth 
(virtus veritatis), which he also calls veracity or truthfulness (veracitas). 
Although his account of this virtue goes beyond what Aristotle says in 
[Nicomachean Ethics] EN 4.7, there can be little doubt that he regards 
himself as speaking throughout this general section of the Summa of the 
virtue discussed in that chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics.1
In other words, Flannery claims that there is little doubt that when 
Aquinas speaks about the virtue of truth and its opposing vices in the 
1 Kevin Flannery, ‘being truthful with (or lying to) others about oneself ’, in Aquinas 
and the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn müller and matthias Perkams 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge university Press, 2013), pp. 129–145 (p. 142).
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Summa theologiae (ST) 2-2.109-113, he regards himself as speaking of 
the same virtue of truth as found in EN 4.7 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
In subsequent paragraphs, Flannery elaborates on why we should 
have little doubt about this fact, the main points of which I summarise 
as follows. First, in ST 2-2.109.1, dedicated to the question of whether 
truth is a virtue, Aquinas immediately cites Aristotle in the sed contra, 
in particular the fact that Aristotle places truth among the other virtues 
in the second and fourth book of the Ethics. on this basis, Flannery 
claims, ‘That he [Aquinas] is discussing the EN 4.7 virtue remains his 
presupposition in all the relevant passages in ST 2-2.109-113’. Second, 
in ST 2-2.109.1 resp., the object of what Aquinas describes as the virtue 
of truth, namely truth, matches the core principle that specifies not only 
the act but also the corresponding virtue in Aristotle’s account in EN 4.7, 
namely that, in itself, ‘falsehood is foul and blameworthy, and truth is noble 
and praiseworthy’.2 Third, that Aquinas takes care to relate an expanded 
sense of truth-telling, such as the ‘truth of doctrine’, back into the more 
narrow sense defined explicitly by the scope of the Aristotelian virtue, 
which is truth in terms of the way one manifests oneself to others (cf. ST 
2-2.109.3 ad 3). Hence, Flannery claims, ‘Aquinas understands himself 
to be speaking in ST 2-2.109.2-3  – and, by implication, throughout 
ST 2-2.109-113  – about the virtue (and the corresponding act) at the 
core of EN 4.7’. Further to this point, Flannery draws attention to 
corroborating evidence from ST 2-2.111.3 ad 2, in particular the notion 
that simplicity and truth-telling are the same thing, understood from 
different perspectives.3 Finally, when considering Augustine’s eight-fold 
division of types of lying in de Mendacio 14.25, Aquinas connects the 
fourth type ‘tucked between the augmenting group and the diminishing 
group’ directly to Aristotle’s words in EN 4.7.4 The implication seems 
to be that what Aquinas means by lying ‘out of the sheer lust for lying, 
which proceeds from habit’, or what one might described as lying in its 
‘pure form’, is precisely what Aristotle means. Hence, although Flannery 
concedes that Aquinas says many things in ST 2-2.109-113 that are not 
found in EN 4.7, ‘nor even easily derivable from things that are found 
there’, nevertheless, Aquinas’s expanded account ‘grows out of the same 
virtue presented in EN 4.7’.
2 Flannery, p. 143.; cf. EN 1127a28-30.
3 Flannery, p. 144.
4 Flannery, p. 145.
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In this paper, I argue that this conclusion is mistaken. In making this 
claim, I do not disagree with any of the excellent, finely-honed points of 
detail to which Flannery draws attention, or indeed any of the steps he 
makes in his arguments, except the final ones. moreover, like Flannery, 
I am impressed with the evident respect that Aquinas has for Aristotle, 
not least in the way he takes trouble to ‘retrofit’, one might say, his own 
expanded notion of truth-telling back into the Aristotelian approach to 
the matter of the virtue, that is, pertaining to how one presents oneself. 
I  take this fact as indicative of the way in which Aquinas will go to 
considerable length to agree with Aristotle – if he can do so. Nevertheless, 
I hold the overall conclusion, that Aquinas regards himself as speaking 
of the same virtue of truth, or one that at least ‘grows out of ’ the virtue 
discussed in that chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics, to be mistaken, and 
for the following reason alone if for no other: what Aquinas normally 
means by a  virtue throughout ST 2-2.1-170 is different in kind from 
what Aristotle means by a  virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. In other 
words, Aquinas’s account of the virtue of truth cannot be divorced from 
what he says about virtue in general, an understanding closely related to 
contemporary work on the second-person perspective and with broader 
implications for other moral questions about truth and lying.
II. AQuINAS AND True VIrTue
The notion that Aquinas’s account of virtue ethics in the Summa 
theologiae goes beyond what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, as 
indeed Flannery claims about the virtue of truth, is incontrovertible and 
has long been accepted by scholars. Nevertheless, even to the present day, 
the extent of their differences has been surprisingly underappreciated. 
Although I have recently argued this point in detail elsewhere, I present 
a brief summary here of issues that are pertinent to the present topic.5
An  initial indication of the distinctiveness of Aquinas’s account is 
that when he introduces the genus of virtue, in ST 1-2.55, he does so in 
a strikingly non-Aristotelian way,
Virtue is a  good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of 
which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us.6
5 See especially chapter one of Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in 
Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and Gifts (New York; Abingdon, uK: routledge, 2012).
6 ST 1-2.55.4, ‘Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male 
utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operator’. This definition is taken from lombard, 
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Aquinas further clarifies that God working virtue ‘without us’ in this 
passage does not mean that God infuses virtue in us without our consent.7 
Nevertheless, as eleonore Stump has remarked, ‘This is manifestly 
an un-Aristotelian definition, not least because it is impossible to acquire 
for oneself by practice a disposition that God works in a person without 
that person’.8
Nevertheless, in response to this manifestly non-Aristotelian 
definition, one might claim that God, in Aquinas’s moral universe, 
merely provides a short cut to the virtue that is so arduously acquired 
by habituation according to the Nicomachean Ethics. In other words, 
Aquinas describes the same virtue that Aristotle describes but acquired 
by different means. even setting aside the broader problems, however, 
Aquinas does not permit this interpretation. He agrees that there are 
indeed some dispositions that are also called virtues and are acquired in 
the Aristotelian manner by habituation.9 What Aquinas means by a perfect 
virtue, however, is infused by God.10 Although these infused virtues may 
sometimes have the same names as their acquired counterparts, such 
as ‘justice’ or ‘temperance’, they are specifically different in ways that 
cannot be reduced to diverse origins.11 To cite some important examples, 
Sent., 2.27.1 no. 1 and draws principally from Augustine, de Libero Arbitrio 2.19. Here 
and elsewhere in this paper, I use the translation with minor alterations of the Fathers 
of the english Dominican Province, Thomas Aquinas, The ‘Summa Theologica’ of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Literally Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(london: burns, oates and Washbourne ltd., 1911-1935). The distinctiveness of 
Aquinas’s approach to the definition of virtue has been pointed out, for example, by 
mark Jordan, ‘Theology and Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. 
by Norman Kretzmann and eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
1993), pp. 232–251 (pp. 237–241). As Jordan also points out, this definition is the only 
one that Aquinas sets out explicitly to defend.
7 ST 1-2.55.4 ad 6, ‘Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our 
part, but not without our consent (virtus infusa causatur in nobis a  Deo sine nobis 
agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus)’.
8 eleonore Stump, ‘The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s ethics: Aquinas on 
the Passions’, Faith and Philosophy, 28 (2011), 29 – 43 (p. 32).
9 See, for example, ST 1-2.63.2.
10 ST 1-2.65.2 resp., ‘only the infused virtues are perfect and are to be called virtues 
without qualification since they order a  human being well toward the ultimate end 
without qualification (Solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae 
virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter)’.
11 Aquinas differentiates acquired and infused justice in ST 1-2.100.12, claiming that 
only the latter is true justice. In ST 1-2.47.14, he distinguishes acquired and infused 
prudence. In ST 1-2.63.4, he describes acquired and infused temperance as distinct 
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these infused dispositions can be possessed by anyone, including young 
children, are unified by the virtue of love (caritas) rather than prudence 
alone and can exist with previously acquired contrary dispositions.12 
moreover, many of these infused virtues have no Aristotelian counterparts 
at all, notable examples including faith, hope, love and humility.13
besides these points, a further distinction deserves a special mention, 
since it throws starkly into relief the non-Aristotelian characteristics 
and mystery of Aquinas’s account of the infused virtues. Aquinas claims 
that infused virtues are infused all at once, not by a gradual process of 
repeated good actions. Conversely, the infused virtues can also be lost 
immediately, not by a gradual process of habituating vice, but through 
a single seriously evil action or omission termed a ‘mortal sin’:
For every mortal sin is contrary to love, which is the root of all the 
infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, love being banished by 
one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled 
(excluduntur) ‘as virtues’  ... As to the acquired virtues, they are not 
destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. Accordingly, mortal sin is 
incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired 
virtue: while venial [i.e. non-mortal] sin is compatible with virtues, 
whether infused or acquired.14
species of temperance. He also argues explicitly that a difference of efficient cause alone 
cannot establish a difference of species, cf. ST 1-2.63.4 ad 3, which makes this point by 
equating the species of sight being given miraculously with sight acquired naturally.
12 Citing especially ST 2-2.47.14, Jean Porter draws attention to Aquinas’s claim that 
anyone, including young children, can have infused virtues. Since these infused virtues 
include prudence, normally understood as requiring considerable experience and 
intellectual maturity, this claim further undermines attempts to provide an Aristotelian 
interpretation of Aquinas’s infused virtues. See Jean Porter, ‘The Subversion of Virtue: 
Acquired and Infused Virtues in the “Summa Theologiae”’, Annual of the Society of 
Christian Ethics (1992), pp. 19–41 (p. 32). Porter and bonnie Kent also point out the 
peculiarity that the infused virtues can co-exist with previously acquired contrary 
disposition, cf. ibid. p. 30 and bonnie Kent, ‘Does Virtue make It easy to be Good? The 
Problematic Case of St. Paul’, in Les Philosophies Morales et Politiques au Moyen Âge: 
Actes du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, Ottawa, 17-22 Août 1992, 
ed. by bernardo C bazán, eduardo Andújar and leonard G Sbrocchi (ottawa: legas, 
1995), pp. 723–732 (p. 728).
13 Cf. ST 2-2.1-46; 161-165.
14 ST 1a2ae q.71 a.4, ‘Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati, quae est 
radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt virtutes, et ideo per unum actum 
peccati mortalis, exclusa caritate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusae, 
quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes ... Virtutes vero acquisitae non tolluntur per unum 
92 ANDreW PINSeNT
This passage underlines a  vital distinction, namely that, according to 
Aquinas, the infused virtues are ‘excluded’ or ‘cut off ’ (excluduntur) – in 
as much as they are virtues – when love is lost by a single serious sin. 
Hence the word used for such sins is ‘mortal’, precisely because they 
kill or extinguish divine love in the soul. Conversely, no acquired virtue 
can be lost or eradicated by any one action. When stated so plainly, 
an Aristotelian interpretation of infused virtues is plainly indefensible. 
Indeed, as Jean Porter has pointed out, even calling infused dispositions 
‘virtues’ is, on this basis, only possible in a carefully qualified sense.15 Yet 
even though such virtues are properly speaking the true virtues, insofar 
as they are necessary and sufficient for what Aquinas regards as true 
human flourishing, their importance and characteristics still do not, to 
my mind, attract sufficient scholarly attention.16
Given that the genus of perfect, proper or true virtue is infused, 
according to Aquinas, the issue that is most pertinent to the correct 
interpretation of the virtue of truth in ST 2-2.109-113 can be summarised 
as follows. If the virtue of truth is not an  infused virtue or is at least 
ambiguous, then an  Aristotelian interpretation may still be possible. 
If, however, it is clear that the virtue described in these questions does 
belong to the infused virtues, that the Aristotelian interpretation is 
clearly excluded.
III. AQuINAS AND THe VIrTue oF TruTH
The virtue of truth, as described in ST 2-2.109-113, is a part of a much 
larger structure of perfective attributes covering the first 170 questions of 
ST 2-2. Assuming that Aquinas regards himself as presenting a coherent 
account of human flourishing (and regardless of whether or not he 
succeeds), an examination of this superstructure can and should provide 
important clues as to the kinds of perfective dispositions he intends to 
describe within the specific questions on truth.
actum cuiuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest simul esse cum 
virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum virtutibus acquisitis. Peccatum vero 
veniale potest simul esse et cum virtutibus infusis, et cum acquisitis.’
15 Porter, p.  20. See also rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, ‘Power made Perfect in 
Weakness: Aquinas’s Transformation of the Virtue of Courage’, Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology, 11 (2003), 147–180 (p. 150).
16 See, for example, ST 2-2.22.7, in which Aquinas claims that no strictly true virtue is 
possible without the (infused) theological virtue of love, indicating that he considers that 
acquired dispositions, in the absence of the infused virtues, are not strictly true virtues.
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The virtue of truth is the sixth of nine virtues that Aquinas connects 
to justice as ‘quasi-potential parts’ of justice (ST 2-2.80-120), one of 
three blocks of questions that consider the various parts of justice 
(ST  2-2.61-79), following on from the treatment of the virtue itself 
(ST 2-2.57-60). Justice itself is the fifth of seven major virtues that form 
the largest scale divisions of Aquinas’s account of the particular virtues 
in ST 2-2.1-170. As noted previously, three of these seven major virtues, 
faith, hope and love (ST 2-2.1-46), have absolutely no Aristotelian 
counterparts, lending credence from the outset to the view that Aquinas’s 
account of virtues in ST 2-2 as a whole is non-Aristotelian.
The details of Aquinas’s account of justice raise still more problems 
for the Aristotelian interpretation, as can be seen from many of the topics 
that Aquinas chooses to address under this heading. He examines, for 
instance, the vices of reviling, detraction, tale-bearing, cursing, simony, 
as well as the virtues of religion and its acts of devotion, adoration, 
service, and prayer, including questions about the petitions of the lord’s 
Prayer and whether God should be praised in song.17 These manifestly 
non-Aristotelian topics make an  Aristotelian interpretation awkward 
at best. Yet the structure of Aquinas’s questions on justice exemplifies 
another peculiarity of his approach, namely that human perfection 
involves more than simply the acquisition of virtues. After the treatment 
of the virtue of justice itself, Aquinas appends another disposition, 
the gift of piety, which is an  infused disposition (habitus), but is not 
an infused virtue. moreover, after the gift, he mentions two other kinds 
of perfective attributes: two actualisations of virtue and gifts in the form 
of promissory sentences called ‘beatitudes’, and three actualisations 
called ‘fruits’ that are described elsewhere as a kind of joyful completion 
of Aquinas’s account of true human perfection.18 So Aquinas’s account 
of justice follows the same fourfold pattern that Aquinas first introduces 
in the ST when he introduces the topic of virtue and its three connected 
matters: gifts, beatitudes, and fruits. Hence according to Aquinas, his 
account of the genus of virtue, and the virtue of justice specifically, form 
only a  part of a  larger, ‘organic’ network of virtues, gifts, beatitudes, 
17 ST 2-2.72-76, 81-100.
18 The gift of piety and its corresponding beatitudes and fruits are covered in ST 
2-2.121. Note that the gift of piety is different from the virtue of piety, which is covered 
in ST 2-2.101, underlining how the homonymous virtue and gift are distinct habitus. For 
an interpretation of the role of the gifts, beatitudes and fruits, see chap. 2 and 4 of Pinsent.
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and fruits (VGbF).19 In whatever way this network is interpreted, the 
structure of justice seems to be based on a plan that cannot remotely be 
described as Aristotelian.
What about the virtue of truth specifically? Can the virtue described 
in ST 2-2.109-113 be considered the same as that of EN 4.7, despite the 
many non-Aristotelian characteristics of the broader structure within 
which these questions are embedded? Certainly there are points of 
similarity, as Flannery describes, but the differences are also substantial. 
For example, when Aristotle raises the issue of the dispositions or states 
of character that are opposed to the virtue of truth, he is referring to 
vices. by contrast, six of the ten articles of ST 2-2.100-113 are explicitly 
about whether, and to what extent, the actions of those vices opposed 
to truth are ‘sins’. moreover, if this difference is explained away simply 
as the disposition compared to its associated action, it should be added 
that three of the six articles examine the question of whether the acts 
associated with these vices are mortal sins.20 As noted previously, 
a  characteristic of a  single mortal sin, according to Aquinas, is that it 
expels or cuts off infused virtues (and associated dispositions, including 
the gifts). The central concern about mortal sins in ST 2-2.100-113 
therefore strongly implies that these questions describe the infused 
virtue of truth, not its Aristotelian counterpart, even if they share certain 
similar characteristics. In addition, the fact that Aquinas argues explicitly 
that these mortal sins are opposed to the virtue of truth insofar as they are 
opposed to the virtue of love (caritas), further underlines that his account 
of truth is consistent with the principles of his broader account of justice 
and of virtue generally.21 These principles are those of the infused virtues, 
which are unified by love (caritas) and cut off by mortal sins.
19 The VGbF structure of Aquinas’s approach to human flourishing is first introduced 
in the preamble of ST 1-2.55, ‘We must speak in the first place of the good dispositions, 
which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the gifts, beatitudes 
and fruits (Primo dicendum est de habitibus bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, 
scilicet dona, beatitudines et fructus).’ The VGbF structure sets the standard pattern of 
nearly all the principal virtues of the ST, and is described as constituting an  ‘organic 
unity’ in Servais Pinckaers, Morality: The Catholic View, trans. by michael Sherwin 
(South bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), p. 87.
20 The articles on whether the vices that are opposed to truth are sins are ST 2-2.110.3, 
111.1, 113.1; the articles on whether they are (or can also be) mortal sins are ST 2-2.110.4, 
111.4, 112.2.
21 The sins against truth are described as mortal insofar as they are against love 
(caritas) throughout ST 2-2.109-113. See, for example, ST 2-2.110.4 resp.
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Finally, the dispositions opposed to truth provide another important 
clue as to the true nature of the virtue being presented. When Aristotle 
considers the vices opposed to the virtue of truth, he considers only 
two, boastfulness and mock-modesty, which broadly correspond to the 
vices that Aquinas describes in ST 2-2.112-113. Nevertheless, Aquinas 
adds two more vices: ‘lying’ (110) and dissimulation or hypocrisy (111). 
These additional vices are not without some importance references to 
Aristotle on points of detail. but the fact is that the structure as a whole, 
with four vices instead of two, is different in kind and not merely in 
degree from Aristotle’s account of the virtue of truth and its opposed 
dispositions. In particular, Aquinas’s account of hypocrisy has only 
a tenuous connection to the issues raised in the Nicomachean Ethics. The 
principal sources cited in these articles are scripture and patristic texts, 
notably those of Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Gregory, and Isidore. 
Taken as a whole, these characteristics strongly suggest that the virtue of 
truth in ST 2-2.109-113 is not acquired in the Aristotelian manner, but 
belongs to the genus of the infused virtues and their associated perfective 
attributes, with much of the inspiration drawn from scripture shaped by 
patristic tradition.
IV. A SeCoND-PerSoN ACCouNT oF THe VIrTue oF TruTH
If the virtue of truth is ST 2-2.109-113 draws certain characteristics from 
Aristotle, as Flannery shows, while still being specifically different, what 
alternative way do we have to interpret what Aquinas means by this 
virtue? This question is difficult to answer at least in part because the 
Nicomachean Ethics has been the ‘canonical text’ of virtue ethics for most 
of the last twenty-three centuries, and because Aristotle has provided 
a commonly accepted and often fairly convincing narrative of how we 
acquire virtue and vice, namely by a kind of habituation that is similar 
to the practice of sports, music, and many other activities.22 Indeed, this 
metaphoric understanding is so influential that it is easy to overlook 
its deficiencies even within the terms of reference of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. For example, it is not easy to explain how genuine courage can 
be acquired by habituation. In the case of Aquinas’s account of true or 
22 The phrase ‘canonical text’ is from Alasdair macIntyre, After Virtue: A  Study in 
Moral Theory, Third Edition, 3rd edition (Notre Dame, Ind.: university of Notre Dame 
Press, 2007), p. 147.
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perfect virtue, however, even habituation does not assist understanding, 
as noted previously, since these virtues can be lost or infused immediately. 
The problem is the lack of an  alternative ‘root metaphor’, denoting 
an embodied experience according to which the peculiar, apparently ad 
hoc details of Aquinas’s account make sense.23 The measure of success 
for such a metaphor is the number and range of facts that it unifies and 
makes credible. Without such a metaphor, no matter how many details 
are stated or inferred, there will be a  lack of understanding of what 
Aquinas means and his account risks remaining incredible.
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, there is, I believe, an alternative 
embodied experience that makes sense of Aquinas’s account, and it is 
found in surprisingly commonplace situations. Consider, for instance, 
the virtue of temperance. The Aristotelian account, according to which 
a  mean is selected according to practical wisdom and then practised 
until it is easy, seems plausible until the question is asked as to how 
children actually learn to eat and drink in an ordered way. As someone 
who has many nieces and one nephew, I have observed that as infants 
they were not good Aristotelians when learning to eat and drink. on the 
contrary, they first learnt to eat and drink properly in the context of social 
interaction, such as a contrived game. Indeed these and other children 
are often far less interested in the food and drink than in the interaction, 
which the parents obviously use to develop virtue. more specifically, this 
kind of interaction is one that contemporary experimental psychologists 
have termed ‘joint attention’, a  working definition of which is ‘to 
share awareness of the sharing of the focus’, which is often combined 
with a sharing of the stance of the other person towards the object of 
attention.24 Joint attention is also closely correlated with (and may be 
equivalent to) a mode of relatedness first investigated by martin buber 
and emmanuel levinas, and which is today called second-personal.25
23 on the importance of metaphor and embodied experience, see Iain mcGilchrist, 
The Master and his Emissary: the Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World 
(New Haven; london: Yale university Press, 2009), p. 116. The term ‘root metaphor’ is 
from michael ruse, Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science, 
1st edn. (New York: Cambridge university Press, 2010).
24 This working definition is taken from Peter Hobson, ‘What Puts Jointness into Joint 
Attention?’, in Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and 
Psychology, ed. by Naomi eilan and others (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 185–204 
(p. 185).
25 martin buber, Ich und Du, 1 aufl. (leipzig: Insel-Verlang, 1923); emmanuel lévinas, 
Totalité Et Infini: Essai Sur L’Extériorité (london: m. Nijhoff, 1961).
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The relation of parent and child in these virtue-infusing games 
provides a clue as to what Aquinas is doing in his account of the virtues, 
except that in Aquinas’s case the second-personal agent is God. The 
key to his account is that the virtues are associated with the gifts, and 
gifts (when analysed in detail) could be described as ‘second-person 
dispositions’. A gift can be understood metaphorically as enabling a joint 
attention relation with God, by which a  human person participates in 
God’s stance toward various matters. So, for example, the gift of piety 
appended to justice generates filial affection, according to which a person 
‘pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all people on account 
of their relationship to God’. In other words, by means of the gift of piety, 
we take on God’s stance towards other people as potential or actual 
sons and daughters, and hence also our potential or actual brothers and 
sisters. For this reason, I suggest, the infused virtue of justice, to which 
piety is appended, has a  different form to its Aristotelian counterpart. 
For example, as noted previously, reviling, detraction, tale-bearing 
and cursing, are not to be found in the Nicomachean Ethics, but are 
all potential mortal sins in Aquinas’s account of justice. These claims 
makes sense, in the light of this metaphor, because such sins attack those 
whom God loves as children and so are incompatible with continuing to 
participate in God’s stance and hence God’s love. Similarly, the nineteen 
novel questions on the virtue of religion that Aquinas considers under 
justice are understandable if the means of growing in virtue to which 
Aquinas refers is second-person relatedness to God, flourishing in divine 
friendship. Assuming then that the root metaphor for understanding 
the virtues and gifts generally is joint attention, how successful is this 
metaphor for understanding Aquinas’s claims about the virtue of truth 
specifically?
As in the other cases, a successful metaphor will be one that unifies 
and makes sense of what might otherwise seem to be ad hoc claims. As 
noted previously, in comparison to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas 
multiplies the number of vices opposed to truth from two to four. Can 
this be understood in the light of the root metaphor of joint attention? 
I  think so, for the following reason. In everyday instances of joint 
attention that also involve use of language, there are several distinct 
modes of communication with the second person. one can talk about 
some concrete or abstract object, an object that is also, for the duration 
of the conversation and at least implicitly, an object of joint attention. 
one can also talk about oneself from a  first-person perspective. one 
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can also talk to the second person about the second person, although 
the latter case arguably reduces to some concrete or abstract object of 
implicit joint attention, such as ‘You looking well’, or to some first-person 
perspective on the other, such as ‘I  think you are looking well’. Hence 
the third mode reduces to the first and second modes. Finally, there is 
non-verbal communication, including, for example, glances, prosody, 
‘motherese’ (in the case of speaking to infants), ‘mirroring’ and so on.26 
A good deal of this communication may be subliminal but nevertheless 
has considerable impact on the sense of union of the persons.
These distinct modes of communication therefore also make distinct 
kinds of actions possible that are opposed to truthful second-person 
relatedness oriented towards friendship. With language, one can lie 
about a concrete or abstract object that is, at least implicitly, an object of 
joint attention. one can also lie in communicating a first-person account 
of oneself and one’s thoughts. Finally, one can deliberately communicate 
false impressions to the second person by non-verbal means. These 
distinctions can, I think, be mapped to the non-Aristotelian complex of 
vices that Aquinas opposes to the virtue of truth. There is boastfulness 
and mock-modesty (ST 2-2.112-113), which cover falsehood about 
oneself, and which are most closely paralleled in Aristotle’s account. 
Nevertheless, Aquinas adds lying, which can be interpreted as falsehood 
about objects of implicit or explicit joint attention (ST 2-2.110), and 
hence distinguished from boastfulness and mock-modesty. Finally, 
there is an  important vice that is wholly omitted from Aristotle’s 
account, but which is extremely important to Aquinas and his tradition, 
namely dissimulation or hypocrisy (ST 2-2.111). According to Aquinas, 
dissimulation covers actions that are not words but which signify 
something different to what is in one’s mind, in other words non-verbal 
26 There is a vast and rapidly growing literature on non-verbal communication, but 
a key point to note here is that such communication cannot easily be abstracted from the 
context of a specific ‘I’ communicating with a specific ‘you’, re-emphasising the need to 
think about language not simply in terms of objective symbol use and organization, but 
as a communicative interaction between persons. See John T. Nusbaum, ‘language and 
Communication’, in The Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience, ed. by Jean Decety and 
John T. Cacioppo, 1st edn. (New York: oxford university Press, 2011), pp. 668–679. The 
irreducibility and importance of prosody and other non-verbal communication has been 
shown by many methods, for example, by the effects of damage to the right hemisphere’s 
perisylvian region correlated with an impaired ability to use prosody to express emotion 
(Kenneth m Heilman, Susan A leon and John C rosenbek, ‘Affective aprosodia from 
a medial frontal stroke’, Brain and language, 89 (2004), 411–416).
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communication. The example he selects from Isidore (Etym. x), also 
confirms the kind of falsehood Aquinas has in mind, when he says that 
‘the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come 
on to the stage with a disguised face  ... so as to deceive the people in 
their acting’.27 Hence, rather than an ad hoc list, an account of truth in 
reference to the metaphor of second-person relatedness can provide 
an understanding that unifies and makes sense of these multiple vices.
What about the single lie that destroys the virtue of truth? As noted 
previously, this is perhaps the single most counterintuitive claim from 
the Aristotelian perspective, since habituation cannot accommodate 
the instantaneous gain or loss of a disposition. by contrast, even though 
Aquinas presents an  extremely nuanced account of the modes and 
degrees by which it is possible to sin by falsehood, at least some of these 
sins can be ‘mortal’ and hence it is possible to lose the virtue of truth by 
a single act. but what does this mean? How are we supposed to imagine 
this is possible?
In general terms and to the best of my knowledge, an  account of 
human flourishing organised round the principle of second-person 
relatedness, oriented towards friendship, is the only way of making sense 
of the claim that a virtue can be lost or gained instantly. Acts of betrayal 
or of reconciliation, unlike habituation, can be singular actions. To give 
an example, a person can betray his spouse without suddenly losing the 
habitual dispositions of good living, but such dispositions cease to be 
effective, as virtues organised towards the flourishing of the relationship, 
so long as the relationship has not been reconciled. This account makes 
sense of Aquinas’s claim that the infused virtues, but not the acquired 
dispositions, are ‘cut off ’ (excluduntur) by singular, gravely evil actions.28
Within this promising picture overall, the virtue of truth presents 
a  slightly more challenging scenario, however, since betrayal and 
reconciliation appear to fall more directly under the scope of justice. 
As Flannery affirms, however, Aquinas follows Aristotle in identifying 
the virtue of truth simply as that by which a person says what is true. 
Sins against truth therefore have to be distinguished, at least in principle 
if not often in practice, from sins against justice. Indeed, on the basis 
of a  commonly accepted definition of lying, ‘to make a  believed-false 
statement to another person with the intention that that other person 
27 ST 2-2.111.2 resp.
28 Cf. Pinsent, p. 75.
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believe that statement to be true’,29 it is possible for the liar to speak the 
truth accidentally, doing no apparent injustice to anyone else, and yet still 
be guilty of lying, perhaps even mortally. How can the second-person 
perspective shed light on a way to understand these cases?
recalling that what is ‘mortal’ about mortal sin is that it cuts off the 
possibility of second-person relatedness, culminating in friendship, then 
if there is no external damage, the logical place to look next is internally. 
In particular, one way of addressing this question, also drawn from the 
study of the second-person perspective, has been explored by Stump in 
Wandering in Darkness. In particular, she argues that,
All moral wrongdoing contributes to psychic fragmentation  ... This 
lack of internal integration undermines or obviates closeness between 
persons. even God cannot be close to a human being who is internally 
fragmented and alienated from himself.30
on this analysis, wrongdoing in general causes a psychic fragmentation 
that inhibits friendship, insofar as a person both wills and rejects second-
person union with the other person. Prima facie, it is plausible that lying 
has an especially destructive effect on psychic union, since what is said 
(or otherwise communicated to the other) and what is believed are at 
variance with one another. Hence even if what is said turns out to be true, 
doing no harm to the other personal agent at all, and therefore doing 
nothing to erode trust, the liar still plausibly damages himself in a way 
that damages friendship. To put this issue another way, in a situation of 
psychic fragmentation, there is no longer a person with a wholly unified 
psyche with whom one can be friends. As rather disturbing corroboration, 
it is worth adding that liars can apparently get into a state in which they 
cannot recognise their own lies. This phenomenon suggests the onset 
of an internal fragmentation and the loss of a coherent grasp of reality. 
moreover, habitual lying is often also associated with narcissism, which 
is also toxic to friendship.31
29 James edwin mahon, ‘The Definition of lying and Deception’, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by edward N. Zalta, Fall 2008: <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2008/entries/lying-definition/> [accessed 27 November 2013].
30 eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), p. 395.
31 Salman Akhtar and Henri Parens, Lying, Cheating, and Carrying on: Developmental, 
Clinical, and Sociocultural Aspects of Dishonesty and Deceit (lanham, maryland: Jason 
Aronson, 2009).
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This analysis suggests that internal fragmentation can destroy the 
possibility of friendship with a  second person, but what about the 
boundary case of a  single lie that remains secret and does no harm? 
As is well known, singular, external actions can have dramatic moral 
consequences for relationships, but there may also be a parallel in regard 
to internal actions. As is commonly experienced and has been verified 
experimentally many times, ‘the act of breaking one’s resolve can lead to 
a general dys-regulation of appetitive behaviour’.32 In other words, one 
action can generate a moral transformation. As one way of understanding 
this, I suggest the following. If a capacity for second-person relatedness 
is ‘hard-wired’ into our being, and perhaps even into what it means to 
be a person, the internal psychic integration of particular persons may 
work along similar and perhaps derivative lines.33 Hence, just as it is 
possible to break an external relationship by a single act of betrayal, it 
may be possible to break an internal psychic unity by a single serious lie 
that is accidentally true and does no external harm. on this basis, even 
one serious lie could render a person internally disordered, unable fully 
and honestly to relate in a second-personal way, conducive to friendship, 
until there has been some kind of reconciliation that enables internal 
reintegration. This is a topic that would need to be explored in more detail, 
especially as further research is carried out in experimental psychology 
and social neuroscience. Nevertheless, an  interpretation of Aquinas’s 
32 Dylan D. Wagner, Kathryn e. Demos and Todd F. Heatherton, ‘Staying in Control: 
The Neural basis of Self-regulation and Its Failure’, in Decety and Cacioppo eds., The 
Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience, pp. 360–377 (p. 367). Cf. C. P. Herman and D. 
mack, ‘restrained and unrestrained eating’, Journal of personality, 43 (1975), 647–660.
33 As examples of how second-person relatedness may precede and ground the 
development of a first-person consciousness, it has been argued that infants are moved to 
engage in joint attention with others, and even to acquire rudimentary moral perception, 
even before they have properly formed first-person awareness, some time in their second 
year. on these and related issues see, for example, m. D. Ferrari and robert J Sternberg, 
Self-Awareness: Its Nature and Development (New York: Guilford Press, 1998); Julian Paul 
Keenan, Gordon G. Gallup and Dean Falk, The Face in the Mirror: The Search for the 
Origins of Consciousness (New York: ecco, 2003); bruce m. Hood, J. Douglas Willen and 
Jon Driver, ‘Adult’s eyes Trigger Shifts of Visual Attention in Human Infants’, Psychological 
Science, 9 (1998), 131–134; michael l. Kirwan, lauren K. White and Nathan A. Fox, ‘The 
emotion-Attention Interface: Neural, Developmental, and Clinical Considerations’, in 
Decety and Cacioppo eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience, pp. 227–242. 
For recent work on the moral awareness of infants, see Paul bloom, Just Babies: The 
Origins of Good and Evil (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2013).
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account of the virtue of truth in terms of second-person relatedness 
seems to be far more promising than Aristotelian habituation.
V. CoNCluSIoNS AND ImPlICATIoNS
The indications that the virtue of truth in ST 2-2.109-113 belongs to the 
category of perfect or infused virtues, as well the doubling of its opposing 
vices, imply that this virtue is not Aristotelian, despite certain similarities 
to the corresponding disposition of the Nicomachean Ethics. moreover, 
singular actions that exclude virtues, a possibility considered under the 
category of ‘mortal sins’ in ST 2-2.110-113 are incompatible with the 
‘root metaphor’ of Aristotelian virtue ethics, namely habituation.
by contrast, an understanding of the virtue of truth in terms of joint 
attention or second-person relatedness can accommodate and unify these 
claims. In particular, the diverse kinds of interpersonal communication 
involved in second-person relatedness give rise to diverse possibilities 
for falsehood that can be mapped to the vices that Aquinas lists in these 
questions. moreover, the notion that a  relationship can be betrayed 
or reconciled, possibly even when the relationship is between parts 
of one’s own psyche, may also provide a  way to understand Aquinas’s 
single most puzzling claim, namely that it is possible for perfect virtues, 
including truth, to be ‘cut off ’ or restored as virtues by singular actions. 
In these questions, as elsewhere in ST 2-2.1-170, the metaphor that gives 
insight into Aquinas’s claims is joint attention with a second person, not 
habituation as in the Aristotelian case.
For Aquinas, the principal second-person agent is God, but the 
general idea of forms of virtue being infused by second-person 
relatedness has implications beyond this specific theological context. For 
example, if lying is always wrong, as both Aristotle and Aquinas claim, 
this has proved a hard position to defend today, ultimately because in 
many ethical frameworks, the good of truth-telling is only related by 
a  fairly long causal chain to some ultimate good, a  connection that 
is apparently broken in hard cases. by contrast, the virtue ethics of 
Aquinas may be one example of a way in which truth-telling and human 
flourishing are more inherently linked, since second-person relatedness 
properly requires a  personal integration that is damaged or destroyed 
by falsehood. As research into second-person relatedness continues, this 
approach to truth will warrant further investigation.
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